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Abstract
In his seminal book The Inmates are Running
the Asylum: Why High-Tech Products Drive Us
Crazy And How To Restore The Sanity [2004,
Sams Indianapolis, IN, USA], Alan Cooper ar-
gues that a major reason why software is of-
ten poorly designed (from a user perspective)
is that programmers are in charge of design de-
cisions, rather than interaction designers. As a
result, programmers design software for them-
selves, rather than for their target audience; a
phenomenon he refers to as the ‘inmates run-
ning the asylum’. This paper argues that ex-
plainable AI risks a similar fate. While the re-
emergence of explainable AI is positive, this
paper argues most of us as AI researchers
are building explanatory agents for ourselves,
rather than for the intended users. But ex-
plainable AI is more likely to succeed if re-
searchers and practitioners understand, adopt,
implement, and improve models from the vast
and valuable bodies of research in philosophy,
psychology, and cognitive science; and if evalu-
ation of these models is focused more on people
than on technology. From a light scan of litera-
ture, we demonstrate that there is considerable
scope to infuse more results from the social and
behavioural sciences into explainable AI, and
present some key results from these fields that
are relevant to explainable AI.
1 Introduction
“Causal explanation is first and foremost a
form of social interaction. One speaks of giving
causal explanations, but not attributions, per-
ceptions, comprehensions, categorizations, or
memories. The verb to explain is a three-
place predicate: Someone explains something
to someone. Causal explanation takes the form
of conversation and is thus subject to the rules
of conversation.” — Hilton [1990].
The term “explainable AI” has regained trac-
tion again recently, after being considered im-
portant in the 80s and 90s in expert systems
particularly; see [Chandrasekaran et al., 1989],
[Swartout and Moore, 1993], and
[Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984]. High visibility of
the term, sometimes abbreviated XAI, is seen in
grant solicitations [DARPA, 2016] and in the popular
press [Nott, 2017]. One area of explainable AI receiving
attention is explicit explanation, on which we say more
below.
While the title of the paper is deliberately tongue-in-
cheek, the parallels with Cooper [2004] are real: leaving
decisions about what constitutes a good explanation of
complex decision-making models to the experts who un-
derstand these models the best is likely to result in fail-
ure in many cases. Instead, models should be built on an
understanding of explanation, and should be evaluated
using data from human behavioural studies.
In Section 2, we describe a simple scan of the 23 ar-
ticles posted as ‘Related Work’ on the workshop web
page. We looked at two attributes: whether the pa-
pers were built on research from philosophy, psychology,
cognitive science, or human factors; and whether the re-
ported evaluations involved human behavioural studies.
The outcome of this scan supports the hypothesis that
ideas from social sciences and human factors are not suf-
ficiently visible in the field.
In Section 3, we present some key bodies of work on ex-
planation and related topics from social and behavioural
sciences that will be of interest to those in explainable
AI, and briefly discuss what their impact could be.
2 Explainable AI Survey
To gather some data to test the hypothesis that the so-
cial sciences and human behavioural studies are not hav-
ing enough impact in explainable AI, a short literature
survey was undertaken. This survey is not intended to
be even close to comprehensive – it is merely illustrative.
However, the results that it shows are reflective of many
other papers in the area that the authors have read.
2.1 Selected Papers
The articles surveyed were taken from the ‘Related
Work’ list that was posted on the website for the IJ-
CAI 2017 Explainable AI workshop1 as of 16 May 2017
— the workshop to which this paper is submitted. In
total 23 articles were on the list, although one was not
included in the results as described later. This list can
be found in Appendix A.
As noted already, this list is far from comprehensive,
however, it is a useful list for two reasons:
1. First, it was compiled by the explainable AI com-
munity: the organisers of the conference requested
that people send related papers to be added to the
list. As such, it represents at least a subset of what
the community see at the moment as highly relevant
papers for researchers in explainable AI.
2. Second, it is objective from the perspective of the
authors of this paper. We did not contribute to the
list, so the selection is not biased by our argument.
While the authors of some of the listed papers may
not consider their work as explainable AI, almost all of
the papers were describing methods for automatically
generating explanations of some type.
The paper that was excluded is Tania Lombrozo’s sur-
vey paper on explanation research in cognitive science
[Lombrozo, 2012]. This is not an explainable AI paper –
indeed, it summarises one of the bodies of work of which
we argue people should be more aware.
2.2 Survey Method
The survey was lightweight: it only looked for evidence
that the presented research was somehow influenced by
a scientific understanding of explanations, and that the
evaluations were performed using data derived from hu-
man behaviour studies or similar. We categorised the
papers on the three items of interest, with the criteria
for the scores as follows:
1. On topic: Each paper was categorised as either be-
ing about explainable AI or not, based on our un-
derstanding of the topic. It is possible that some
papers were included on the workshop website be-
cause they presented good challenges or potentially
useful approaches, but were not papers about ex-
planation per se, in which case they were ‘off topic’.
2. Data Driven: Each paper was given a score from
0–2 inclusive.
A score of 1 was given if and only if one or more
of the references of the paper was an article on ex-
planation in social science, meaning that: (a) expla-
nation or causal attribution as done by humans is
one of the main topics of the referenced article(s);
(b) the referenced article(s) validated their claims
using data collected from human behaviour experi-
ments; and (c) the referenced article(s) appear in a
non-computer science venue or in a computer sci-
ence venue but contributed to the understanding of
explanation in general (outside of AI).
1
See http://home.earthlink.net/~dwaha/research/meetings/ijcai17-xai/.
A score of 2 was given if and only if (a), (b), and
(c) above held, and the survey article (not the refer-
enced article) described an algorithm for automat-
ically generating explanations and this algorithm
was derived from data from the social sciences. In
other words, the algorithm is explicitly based on a
model from one or more of the references.
A score of 0 was given for any other paper; that is,
no references satisfying (a), (b), and (c).
3. Validation: Each paper was given a binary 0/1. A
score of 1 was given if and only if the evaluation
in the survey article (note, not the referenced ar-
ticle) was based on data from human behavioural
studies. Even if the algorithm is categorised as data
driven, we argue that it is still important to test
that the assumptions and trade-offs made are suit-
able. It is therefore necessary to (eventually) per-
form behavioural studies to test if the explanations
produced by the algorithm are appropriate for hu-
mans.
2.3 Results
Table 1 shows the results for the survey. Results for each
of the surveyed articles are available in Appendix B. Five
papers were deemed ‘off topic’, however, the results are
included because we could not know the intent of those
who submitted articles to the reading list. For the ‘Data
driven’ entry, column ‘N’ means that we were unsure
about the reference. In this case, one paper had a ref-
erence to a cognitive science article of which we were
unable to locate a copy. For the ‘Validation’ entry, col-
umn ‘N’ means ‘not applicable’: three papers were cat-
egorised as not applicable because their status were not
research articles, but review articles or position papers,
and thus, they did not present any algorithm or model
to evaluate.
On topic Off topic
(17 articles) (5 articles)
Criterion N 0 1 2 N 0 1 2
Data driven 1 11 4 1 0 4 0 1
Validation 3 10 4 — 0 4 1 —
Table 1: Results on small survey
These results show that for the on-topic papers, only
four articles referenced relevant social science research,
and only one of them truly built a model on this. Fur-
ther, serious human behavioural experiments are not
currently being undertaken. For off topic papers, the re-
sults are similar: limited input from social sciences and
limited human behavioural experiments.
2.4 Discussion
The results, while only on a small set of papers, provide
ev dence that many models being used in explainable
AI research are not building on current scientific under-
standing of explanation. Further, human behavioural
experiments are rare — something that needs to change
for us to produce useful explanatory agents.
It is important to note that we are not interpreting the
above observations to say that there is not a lot of excel-
lent research on explainable AI. For example, consider
Ribeiro et al. [2016], who have done some remarkable
work on explaining classifiers, and yet scored ‘0’ on the
‘Data Driven’ criteria. Instead, they have constructed
their own understanding of how people evaluate expla-
nations for their particular field over a series of human
behavioural experiments. However, developing such an
understanding will not always be required or even pos-
sible for many researchers, so in these cases, building on
social science research is a sound place to start.
3 Where to? A Brief Pointer to
Relevant Work
In the different sub-fields of social sciences, there are
several hundred articles on explanation, not to mention
another entire field on causality. It is not feasible to ex-
pect that AI researchers and practitioners can navigate
this entire field in addition to their own field of expertise,
especially considering that the relevant literature is writ-
ten for a different audience. However, there are some key
areas that should be of interest to those in explainable
AI, which we outline in this section.
Miller [2017] provides an in-depth survey of all articles
cited in this section plus many other relevant articles,
and draws parallels between this work and explainable
AI. Here, we present several key ideas from that work
to demonstrate ways that models of explainable AI can
benefit from models of human explanation.
3.1 Contrastive Explanation
Perhaps the most important result from this work is
that explanations are contrastive; or more accurately,
why–questions are contrastive. That is, why–questions
are of the form “Why P rather than Q?”, where P is
the fact that requires explanation, and Q is some foil
case that was expected. Most philosophers, psychol-
ogists, and cognitive scientists in this field assert that
all why–questions are contrastive (e.g. see [Hilton, 1990;
Lombrozo, 2012; Miller, 2017]), and that when people
ask for an explanation “Why P?”, there is an implicit
contrast case. Importantly, the contrast case helps to
frame the possible answers and make them relevant
[Hilton, 1990]. For example, explaining “Why did Mr.
Jones open the window?” with the response “Because
he was hot” is not useful if the implied foil is Mr. Jones
turning on the air conditioner, as this explains both the
fact and the foil; or if the implied foil was why Ms. Smith,
who was sitting closer to the window, did not open it in-
stead, as the cited cause does not refer to a cause of Ms.
Smith’s lack of action.
This is a challenge for explainable AI, because it may
not be easy to elicit a contrast case from an observer.
However, it is also an opportunity: as Lipton [1990]
argues, answering a contrastive question is often eas-
ier than giving a full cause attribution because one
only needs to understand the difference between the two
cases, so one can provide a complete explanation without
determining or even knowing all causes of the event.
3.2 Attribution Theory
Attribution theory is the study of how people attribute
causes to events; something that is necessary to pro-
vide explanations. It is common to divide the types of
attribution into two classes: (1) causal attribution of so-
cial behaviour (called social attribution); and (2) general
causal attribution.
Social Attribution The book from Malle [2004],
based on a large body of work from himself and other
researchers in the field, describes a mature model of how
people explain behaviour of others using folk psychol-
ogy. He argues that people attribute behaviour based
on the beliefs, desires, intentions, and traits of people,
and presents theories for why failed actions are described
differently than successful actions; the former often re-
ferring to some precondition that could not be satisfied.
Malle’s work provides a solid foundation on which to
build social attribution and explainable AI models for
many sub-fields of artificial intelligence. Social attribu-
tion is important for systems in which intentional ac-
tion will be cited as a cause; in particular, it is im-
portant for systems doing deliberative reasoning, and
the concepts used in his work are closely linked to
that of systems such as belief-desire-intention models
[Rao and Georgeff, 1995] and AI planning.
Causal Connection Research on how people
connect causes shows that they do so by under-
taking a mental simulation of what would have
happened had some other event turned out differently
[Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Hilton et al., 2005;
McCloy and Byrne, 2000].
However, simulating an entire causal chain is in-
feasible in most cases, so cognitive scientists and
social psychologists have studied how people de-
cide which events to ‘undo’ (the counterfactuals)
to determine cause. For example, people tend to
undo more proximal causes over more distal causes
[Miller and Gunasegaram, 1990], abnormal events
over normal events [Kahneman and Tversky, 1982],
and events that are considered more ‘controllable’
[Girotto et al., 1991].
For explainable AI models, these heuristics are useful
from a computational perspective in large causal chains,
in which causal attribution is intractable in many cases
[Eiter and Lukasiewicz, 2002]. Effectively, they can be
used to ‘skip-over’ or discount some events and not con-
sider their counterfactuals, while being consistent with
what an explainee would expect.
3.3 Explanation Selection
An important body of work is concerned with explana-
tion selection. People rarely expect an explanation that
consists of an actual and complete cause of an event.
Instead, explainers select one or two causes and present
these as the explanation. Explainees are typically able to
‘fill in’ their own causal understanding from just these.
Thus, some causes are better explanations than oth-
ers: events that are ‘closer’ to the fact in question in
the causal chain are preferred over more distal events
[Miller and Gunasegaram, 1990], but people will ‘trace
through’ closer events to more distal events if those dis-
tal events are human actions [Hilton et al., 2005] or ab-
normal events [Hilton and Slugoski, 1986].
In AI, perhaps some models are simple enough that
explanation selection would not be valuable, or visuali-
sation would provide a powerful medium to show many
causes at once. However, for causal chains with than a
handful of causes, we argue that explanation selection
can be used to simplify and/or prioritise explanations.
3.4 Explanation Evaluation
The work discussed in this section so far looks at how ex-
plainees generate and select explanations. There is also a
body of work that studies how people evaluate the qual-
ity of explanations provided to them. The most impor-
tant finding from this work is that the probability that
the cited cause is actually true is not the most important
criteria people use [Hilton, 1996]. Instead, people judge
explanations based on so-called pragmatic influences of
causes, which include criteria such as usefulness, rele-
vance, etc. [Slugoski et al., 1993].
Recent work shows that people prefer ex-
planations that are simpler (cite few causes)
[Lombrozo, 2007], more general (they explain more
events) [Lombrozo, 2007], and coherent (consistent
with prior knowledge) [Thagard, 1989]. In particular,
Lombrozo [2007] shows that the people dispropor-
tionately prefer simpler explanations over more likely
explanations.
These criteria are important to any work in explain-
able AI. Giving simpler explanations that increase the
likelihood that the observer both understands and ac-
cepts the explanation may be more useful to establish
trust, if this is the primary goal of the explanation.
Learning from these and adding them as objective crite-
ria to models of explainable AI is important.
3.5 Explanation as Conversation
Finally, it is important to remember that explanations
are interactive conversations, and that people typically
abide by certain rules of conversation [Hilton, 1990].
Grice’s maxims [Grice, 1975] are the most well-known
and widely accepted rules of conversation. In short, they
say that in a conversation, people consider the following:
(a) quality; (b) quantity; (c) relation; and (d) manner.
Coarsely, these respectively mean: only say what you
believe; only say as much as is necessary; only say what
is relevant; and say it in a nice way. Hilton [1990] ar-
gues that as explanations are conversations, they follow
these maxims. There is body of research that demon-
strates people do follow these maxims, as discussed by
Miller [2017].
Note that we are not arguing that explanations must
be text or verbal. However, explanations presented in a
visual way, for example, should have similar properties,
and these maxims offer a useful set of objective criteria.
3.6 Where not to go
Finally, we discuss work that we believe should be dis-
counted in explainable AI. Specifically, two well-known
theories of explanation, sometimes cited and used in ex-
plainable AI articles, are the logically deductive model of
explanation [Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948], and the co-
variation model [Kelley, 1967]; both of which have had
significant impact. However, since its publication, re-
searchers found that the logically-deductive model was
inconsistent in many ways, and instead derived new
models of explanation. Similarly, the co-variation model
was found be problematic and did not account for many
facets of human explanation [Malle, 2011], so was refined
into other models, such as those of abnormality described
in Section 3.3.
While these models are still cited as part of the history
of research in explanation, they are no longer considered
valid models of human explanation in cognitive and so-
cial science. We contend, therefore, that explainable AI
models should build on these newer models, which are
widely accepted, rather than these earlier models.
4 Conclusions
We argued that existing models of how people gener-
ate, select, present, and evaluate explanations are highly
relevant to explainable AI. Via a brief survey of articles,
we provide evidence that little research on explainable AI
draws on such models. Although the survey was limited,
it is clear from our readings that the observation holds
more generally. We pointed to a handful of key articles
that we believe could be important, but for a proper
presentation and discussion of these, see Miller [2017].
We encourage researchers and practitioners in explain-
able AI to collaborate with researchers and practition-
ers from the social and behavioural sciences, to inform
both model design and human behavioural experiments.
We do not advocate that every paper on explainable
AI should be accompanied by human behavioural ex-
periments — proxy studies are valid ways to evaluate
models of explanation, especially those in early devel-
opment, and computational problems are also of in-
terest. However, we support the emphasis in the re-
cent DARPA solicitation [DARPA, 2016] on reaching
“human-in-the-loop techniques that developers can use
... for more intensive human evaluations,’ and agree with
Doshi-Velez and Kim [2017] that to have a real-world im-
pact, “it is essential that we as a community respect the
time and effort involved to do such evaluations.”
We hope that readers of this paper and participants in
the workshop agree with our position and, where feasible,
adopt existing models and methods to reduce the risk
that it is only the inmates that are running the asylum.
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